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Twenty years ago, in a celebrated article, De Gustibus Non Est
Disputandum, future Nobel laureates George Stigler and Gary Becker
argued for "the proposition that one may usefully treat tastes as stable
over time and similar among people."' Rejecting the contrary notion that
preferences are endogenous, they stated: "[N]o significant behavior has
been illuminated by assumptions of differences in tastes. Instead, they,
along with assumptions of unstable tastes, have been a convenient crutch
to lean on when the analysis has bogged down." 2
In recent work culminating in his 1996 book, Accounting for Tastes,
Becker changes course. He characterizes the conventional
approach-which assumes preferences are "independent of both past and
future consumption" and of "social interactions"-as a "valuable
simplification." 3 But, noting how Adam Smith and Karl Marx focused
on the effect work has on the tastes of the worker, Becker observes that
"modern economics has lost a lot by completely abandoning the classical
concern with the effects of the economy on preferences and attitudes. " 4
He proposes a remedy: "The endogeneity of preferences highlighted in
this book implies that the economy also affects tastes regarding goods,
leisure, and other activities. In other words, preferences both influence
* Visiting Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law; Associate
Professor, lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputanduin, AM.
ECON. REV., Mar. 1977, at 77.
2. Id. at 89.
3. GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 4 (1996).
4. Id. at 19. Indeed, Becker thinks economics lost more by ignoring preference
endogeneity than by assuming away cognitive errors. He believes systemic deviations from
perfect rationality, as for example the framing effects demonstrated by Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251
(1986), have "received excessive attention at the expense" of weaknesses derived from
models that "assume that preferences do not directly depend on either past experiences or
social interactions." BECKER, supra note 3, at 22. For a discussion of economic
modeling in light of cognitive errors, see Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded. Economics
in the Future of the Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 433.
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economic outcomes and are in turn influenced by the economy."5 Thus,
though Becker thinks he can retain "most of [the] simplicity" of existing
economic models, he thinks some sacrifice of simplicity is desirable.6
Make no mistake, Gary Becker still ardently believes that the
economic method will consistently provide more explanatory power for
behavior than its rivals." In Accounting for Tastes, he says of the De
Gustibus article: "We were impressed by how little has been achieved by
the many discussions in economics, sociology, history, and other fields
that postulate almost arbitrary variations in preferences and values when
confronted by puzzling behavior. We hoped that making these puzzles
explicit would hasten the development of more rewarding approaches." 8
Becker's book offers, in his view, the more rewarding approach,9 using
the concepts of personal and social "capital" to explain habit, addiction,
culture, norms, and other influences thought to be beyond the rational
choice method.'" He states: "I do not believe that any alternative
approach-be it founded on 'cultural,' 'biological,' or 'psychological'
forces-comes close to providing comparable insights and explanatory
power.""'
The narrow point of this brief essay is not that "the more things
change, the more they stay the same." Rather, I describe the evolution
in Becker's thinking on endogenous preferences to illustrate two points
about economics, each of which is pertinent to law and economics and its
relation to law and society. First, economics is neither static nor
monolithic. Even within neoclassical microeconomics, there are
5. BECKER, supra note 3, at 18; see also id. at 22 ("Preferences no longer have
independent influences on behavior since personal and social capital are constraints that
operate through preferences.").
6. See id. at vii (stating that the "behavioral dynamics" of the De Gutstibus article
"were unsatisfactory").
7. See id. at 3 ("sociologists and anthropologists do not imbed their analyses of
social forces and culture in a powerful analytic framework."). See also GARY S. BECKER,
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976).
8. BECKER, supra note 3, at 6.
9. Thus, the shift in Becker's views is that in De Guslibus, he and Stigler prefer
economics because it explains behavior without relying on circular arguments of
preference change, while in Accounting for Tastes, Becker prefers economics because he
views his economic theory as providing the best way to explain preference change.
10. I will not attempt to state fully his theory. In general, he wishes to
incorporate into the utility function two "new types of (human) capital stocks." BECKER,
supra note 3, at 5. "Personal capital, P, includes the relevant past consumption and other
personal experiences that affect current and future utilities. Social capital, S, incorporates
the influence of past actions by peers and others in an individual's social network and
control system." Id. at 4. He then explains: "[Tlhe economy . . . changes tastes and
preferences by changing personal and social capital." Id. at 19.
11. Id.
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substantial disagreements on the basic issues of rationality and behavioral
motives. Though these internal disputes are not always evident to other
social science scholars, they are an engine for important and interesting
changes in economic theory. Second, one particular construct Becker
addresses with his new theory-norms-promises to further complicate
law and economics, forcing to the foreground issues that divide economic
theorists, and offering the greatest opportunity for comparative
(cooperative or competitive) research by various law and social science
scholars.
I. DIVERSITY AND CHANGE IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
Academic trends are notoriously difficult to predict, but I believe the
growing complexity in law and economics modeling represents a genuine
and lasting change. External criticism is having some effect. Others have
made this observation before, 2 but my impression is that it bears
repeating because skeptics still think "economics" is necessarily the
simplest and least realistic of rational choice models.
Consider Robert Ellickson's 1989 recommendation that law and
economics scholars complicate their models with insights from psychology
and sociology, concerning, for example, cognitive limitations and cultural
influences.' 3 Ellickson's short article cited a wealth of examples where
economists were already sacrificing some parsimony to achieve greater
realism in their behavioral models. 4 As one example, he recommended
that law and economics seek to explain the social process of preference
12. See, e.g., AMITAI ETzIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW
ECONOMICS (1988); LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Robin
P. Malloy & Christopher K. Rarun eds., 1995).
13. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989). The
article was part of a symposium on "Post-Chicago Law and Economics."
14. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN
BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985) (modeling individual concern for relative
position and relative wealth); George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic
Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, AM. ECON. REV., June 1982, at 307 (modeling
how cognitive resistance to dissonant information might cause workers to systematically
underestimate job risks); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, AM. ECON. REV., Sept. 1986, at 728 (finding
evidence that firms sometimes sacrifice profit to act "fairly"); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A.
Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic 77Teory of Politics, AM. ECON. REV., June
1984, at 279 (finding evidence that legislators' ideology influences their votes); Thomas
C. Schelling, Self-Comnmand in Practice, in Policy, and in the 7heory of Rational Choice,
74 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 1 (1984) (modeling the problems of impulsiveness
and self-control); Richard H. Thaler & H. M. Shefrin, An Economic 77eory of
Self-Control, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392 (1981) (modeling the same).
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formation, what sociologists sometimes call the "internalization of
norms." 5 At the time, Richard Posner responded to Ellickson by
reasserting his position that the reductionism of economics was and should
remain its strength. Posner worried that "too many bells and whistles
will stop the analytic engine in its tracks."' 6 But while no one wants
"too many" complications, economic theorists obviously differ on the
issue of what number of complications is optimal.
As it turned out, Ellickson correctly predicted that "both economics
and law and economics . . . will . . . witness more work on taste
formation." 7 Soon thereafter, Ken Dau-Schmidt published his article
on criminal law as a preference-shaping device.'" Becker's book now
offers a general theory of endogenous preferences, even including the
observation that law can shape preferences.' 9 And despite his defense
of reductionism, Richard Posner went on to complicate matters
considerably, as when he proffered an economic theory of "ideology," in
which groups control the beliefs of their members to further the interest
of the group.'
15. Ellickson, supra note 13, at 45 ("Besides deepening the normative power of
economics, a successful theory of taste formation would enable economists better to make
positive predictions of shifts in supply and demand curves.").
16. Richard A. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on
Ellickson, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 57, 62 (1989). He said an "'enriched' economic
theory of human behavior ... would be consistent with all possible observations" and
therefore not falsifiable. Id. at 60. "A commitment to a relatively simple economic
model, one that does not supply a facile explanation for every regularity (or peculiarity)
in human behavior, forces the analyst to think hard before discarding the possibility that
the behavior under scrutiny may indeed be rational in a straightforward sense." Id. at 62;
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (3d ed. 1986) (stating
that reductionism is inherent in scientific inquiry).
17. Ellickson, supra note 13, at 45.
18. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1; see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal
Prohibitions as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies
in the Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12,
at 153.
19. Becker even makes a point many thought cut against the normative
implications of his earlier work on discrimination, stating that civil rights laws changed
racial preferences in a way that made interaction more tolerable to racist whites. BECKER,
supra note 3, at 19-20.
20. RICHARD A. POSNER, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, in OVERCOMING
LAW 33-80 (1995) (describing "guilds" as groups that share an ideology-a common
morality and "mystique"; claiming that guilds use ideology to cartelize an industry and
serve the self-interest of guild members); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD
AoE 84-95 (1995) (discussing use of "multiple selves" theory in economic modeling of
choice over time).
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Several Symposium participants demonstrate the increasing diversity
and complexity of economic theories. Tom Ulen, for example, identifies
how psychological research on risky decisions falsifies simple rational
choice models.2' He predicts the future of law and economics will be
a continuous effort to complicate its models as necessary to account for
this and other data, some of which is generated within the discipline.
Eric Posner addresses why contract law does not enforce gratuitous
promises. 2  His approach does not require that every gift have an
ulterior selfish motive, as a caricature of economics might suggest.
Indeed, his paper contrasts with earlier economic models of such promises
not by considering altruism, but by positing a variety of gift
motives-altruism, status seeking, and trust building-and analyzing the
effect of promise enforcement in each case. And, besides his own work
on taste formation, Ken Dau-Schmidt reviews recent law and economic
scholarship on social groups and cooperative norms. 3
Of course, economics still values simple assumptions. One can
comfortably predict that some economic theorists will criticize as
unnecessary all of the above efforts to complicate the behavioral model.
I would agree with such critics that parsimony has sufficient value to
justify some mistrust of new and messier assumptions. But despite the
economist's fondness for simplicity (which strikes some non-economists
as the essential failing of the discipline), almost any plausible cognitive
or motivational complexity has its advocates within economics-risk
misperception,' commitment to habit,' impulsiveness,26 altruism,27
21. Ulen, supra note 4; see also RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL
ECONOMICS (1991); Richard H. Thaler, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1992); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the
Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 487 (1994) (reviewing prior two
books).
22. Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous
Promises, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 567.
23. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 389.
24. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficienc.y Under Informational
Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391 (1990); Ulen,
supra note 4, at 460.
25. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 3, at 118-35 (chapter entitled "Habits,
Addictions, and Traditions"); Robert A. Pollak, Habit Formation and Long-Run Utiliy
Functions, 13 J. ECON. THEORY 272 (1976).
26. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and
Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of Will, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 149 (1991);
Schelling, supra note 14; Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 14.
27. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim & Oded Stark, Altruism Within the Family
Reconsidered: Do Nice Guys Finish Last?, AM. ECON. REV., Dec. 1988, at 1034; David
D. Friedman, Does Altruism Produce Efficient Outcomes? Marshall Versus Kaldor, 17 J.
1997:625
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status,2" and even emotion. 9 Becker's modeling of preference change
is merely one striking example of the increasing complexity of economic
theory.' While some economic thinkers praise the virtue of a model
that can be applied to all behavior-the so-called triumph of economic
imperialism 3 -the natural result of these extensions is that the models
grow increasingly less simple. The outcome is unknown, but the
"complicators" are winning.
In this sense, economics expands its domain and proclaims the power
of its approach; and yet, it seems to me, its approach thereby becomes
(desirably) less distinct from the alternatives. The new problems it
confronts require more attention to the subtle and complex motives
economics could previously ignore. I do not suggest that economics and
sociology are or should be merging. They are not merging because there
remain important methodological differences other participants detail. 2
The disciplines should not merge because, as Dau-Schmidt observes, there
is value in preserving distinct approaches to problems of human
behavior. 3  Despite general differences, however, we have or are
reaching the point where, for some discrete topics, there will be less
substantive difference between some economic and sociological theories
than between theories within the same discipline.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1988).
28. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 14; Richard H. McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992).
29. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC
ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988); Jack Hirshleifer, The Affections and the Passions: Their
Economic Logic, 5 RATIONALITY & SOC. 185 (1993); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu,
Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 31 (1992).
30. What is striking is that Becker is a major part of "Chicago School" economics
and his De Gustibus article, supra note 1, was thought to be a classic statement of the
parsimony of exogenous preferences. On the other hand, Becker says that he has,
"Jallong with others," consistently attempted "to pry economists away from narrow
assumptions about self interest." BECKER, supra note 3, at 139. "Behavior is driven by
a much richer set of values and preferences . . . selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or
masochistic." Id.
31. See BECKER, supra note 7, at 14.
32. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 503; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23. 1 should state that, for most of these
differences, I find myself more comortable with the economic approach. Even as I
participate in complicating the simpler rational choice models, I believe there is value in
beginning with simple assumptions to determine what additional assumptions are strictly
necessary. And even though culture constrains individuals, I believe the superior method
for understanding group influences is to begin with the behavior of individuals-though
I do not think I could prove this to be the case.
33. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 407.
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These observations are rather abstract, so let me turn to a concrete
case: norms.
II. THE NEW NORMS LITERATURE
Ellickson advocated enriching the rational choice model by
incorporating the influence of "culture," by which he meant to include the
internalization of norms. As with the rest of his 1989 article, he was both
reporting on an existing trend and urging that the trend continue and
expand. In this respect, his article and his own norms work were greatly
successful. After ceding the field to anthropology and sociology for many
decades, economics has finally started to take norms seriously. Much of
what economic analysts have to say about norms may strike law and
society advocates as a variation on an old error. But I believe that the
substantial differences dividing economic theories of norms present an
opportunity for law and society scholars to influence the future course of
this subfield of law and economics. I trace the recent history of this
literature and then describe some of its unsettled issues.
Law and economics discovered norms only recently. The first few
efforts-perhaps the very first was Stephen Cheung's 1973 analysis of
norms among orchard owners in rural Washington'-remained isolated
for a time. Then, in the early 1980s, a variety of rational choice scholars
in political science, philosophy, and economics began to address
norms.35 The interest within law and economics accelerated at the same
time. Janet Landa and Robert Cooter asked why, in parts of Asia, ethnic
minorities tended to dominate the "middlemen" position in many
industries.' They contended that these "ethnically homogeneous
middlemen groups" succeed in nations without reliable legal enforcement
of contracts because the group's social connectedness gives its members
34. He found a norm required these orchard owners to keep a quantity of bees
proportionate to their number of orchard trees. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of
the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1973).
35. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER
(1989); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION, AND WELFARE
(1986); George A. Akerlof, A 7heory of Social Custom of Which Unemployment May Be
One Consequence, 94 Q.J. ECON. 749 (1980); Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach
to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095 (1986); see also EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALrI,
THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977).
36. See Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman
Group: An InstitutionalAlternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 350 (1981);
Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versts hnpersonal Trade: The Size of Trading
Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 15 (1984); see also JANET TAI
LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY (1994); Jack L. Carr & Janet T. Landa, The
Economics of Symbols, Clan Names and Religion, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1983).
1997:625
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a unique means of (informally) sanctioning contract breaches by other
group members. At the same time, Ellickson began investigating how
Shasta County, California ranchers settled property disputes."' He
concluded that these ranchers enforced informal norm-based rules for
disputes involving cattle trespass and boundary fences, and thus resolved
certain conflicts without the legal regime.3" In the seminal Order
Without Law, Ellickson criticized the extreme law and society claim that
norms determine behavior to the exclusion of law-what he called "legal
peripheralism"-and also the extreme law and economics claim that law
determines behavior to the exclusion of norms-"legal centralism." 39
Since that time, the rational choice work on norms has mushroomed.
Political scientists, philosophers, economists, and even a rational choice
sociologist developed general models of norms.' Within law and
economics, norms are now a central concern to contracts scholars4' who
37. He completed his investigation a few years later. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of
Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution anong Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 623 (1986); see also Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological
Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987); Robert C. Ellickson, A
Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 83 (1989).
38. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 40-81 (1991). On the other hand, where the conditions are not appropriate for
norms, legal rules still govern the relevant conduct. See id. at 82-103 (discussing disputes
regarding highway collisions involving livestock).
39. He advocated focusing on which "controller" is more powerful in particular
contexts. See id. at 137-55.
40. See BECKER, supra note 3, at 225-30; JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL THEORY (1990) (chs. 10, 11, 30); RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC
OF GROUP CONFLICT (1995); THE DYNAMICS OF NORMS (Crisina Bicehicri et al. eds.,
1997); B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1994);
Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms,
150 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 45 (1994); Robert D. Cooter, Law and Unified
Social Theory, 22 J.L. & Soc'Y 50 (1995); see also Symposium, Normns in Moral and
Social Theory, 100 ETHICS 725-885 (1990).
41. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for mnanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law
for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) [hereinafter Cooter, Decentralized Law]; Robert D.
Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized
Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994) [hereinafter Cooter, StructuralAdjudication];
Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-
Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859 (1996); Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of
Genesis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1993).
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pursue Stewart Macaulay's early finding"2 that norms often determine
business behavior more than law. Ellickson and others continue to study
neighborhood and "street" norms.43 Various theorists use economic
analysis of norms to explain the persistence of race discrimination," the
effectiveness of anti-dueling statutes from the previous century and safe-
sex education efforts from this one,45 and the effect of legislation on the
groups that enforce norms."
In 1995, the American Law and Economics Association had its first
panel devoted exclusively to the economic analysis of norms. In 1996,
the Pennsylvania Law Review published a symposium on "Law,
Economics, and Norms," in which the authors found norms useful to
explain a multitude of legal issues: voting;47 at-will employment;4"
blackmail;49 difficulties in moving from a Marxist to a market
economy;'" and the general efficiency of the common law.5' As I was
42. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
43. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces.: Or
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE LJ. 1165 (1996); see also
Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2055, 2062-63 (1996). Informal land regulation is of considerable interest to many
rational choice scholars. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994); Laurence R. lannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma:
Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives, 100 J. POL. ECON. 271
(1992).
44. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrinination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1064-71,
1083 (1995).
45. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943, 968-72, 1019-25 (1995).
46. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups.- The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 159-60 (1996)
(discussing how employment legislation protecting individual workers undermines the
power of unions and union norms); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norins and Social
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (expressing ambivalence about economic analysis
but using norms to discuss societal trends in smoking, recycling and gender roles).
47. See Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135
(1996).
48. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norns and
the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996).
49. See Richard H. McAdams, Group Noris, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2237 (1996). Saul Levmore also compares legal and norm-based rules governing
anonymous communication in society, concluding that law is unable to mirror the nuances
of the norm-based rules. See Saul Levinore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2191 (1996).
50. See Pildes, supra note 43, at 2062-63.
51. See Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 41, at 1690-94.
1997:625
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preparing this comment, the Journal of Legal Studies published an
economic analysis of norms governing sumo wrestling in Japan.52
If one scratches beneath the surface, it is clear that economic
theorists have widely divergent views on what norms are and how they
function. Despite terminological differences, it seems to me that the
economic literature should engage law and society scholars because the
sociological literature may dispute what some economic theorists claim
and, possibly, because the disputes within economics may mirror disputes
within sociology. Consider a few examples.
First, while much of this literature agrees that norms are informal
obligations, 3 there are competing explanations for how such norms are
enforced. Some theorists view norms as necessarily internalized: the
individual has acquired a "taste" for conforming to the obligation and
feels guilt otherwise. Becker, for example, says that "[niorms are those
common values of a group which influence an individual's behavior
through being internalized as preferences."' Cooter agrees, stating that
"a social norm is ineffective in a community, and does not exist, unless
people internalize it."" Yet I, for one, think norms can arise without
internalization. If one posits only that individuals value what others think
of them, then norms will arise when most people in a group share a
strong consensus as to what behavior merits approval or disapproval,
there is a substantial risk that others will detect the behavior, and the
consensus and risk are well-known.-
When Becker says, for example, that "[a] teenager may begin to
smoke, join a gang, and neglect his studies mainly because his friends
smoke, are gang members, and do not pay attention to school,"57 I do
not think it necessary that the individual or any of her friends have
internalized these behaviors, in the sense that they feel guilt when they do
study or do not smoke. It is entirely sufficient to imagine that, among a
group of teenagers, most enjoy smoking and not studying (or enjoy
rejecting societal values) and therefore approve of others who do the
52. See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norns in Japan's Secret World
of Stwno, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997).
53. See Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 41, at 1656-57.
54. BECKER, supra note 3, at 225.
55. Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 41, at 1665.
56. See McAdams, supra note 44, at 1026-29; Richard H. McAdams, Law,
Economics, and the Origin of Norns, 96 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997); see also
Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725, 751
(1990).
57. BECKER, supra note 3, at 13. Becker does not use this example when
discussing norms. He intends it to show the effect of social factors like the concern for
"respect, recognition, prestige, acceptance." Id. at 12. But when he states his thesis of
norms he defines norms as arising solely by internalization. id. at 225.
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same. And when Cooter says that a new no-smoking ordinance makes it
easier for non-smokers to complain to smokers, 8 that cannot be because
the ordinance caused individuals to "dis-internalize" their preferences
overnight, but because enactment of the law immediately changes beliefs
about what others will approve or disapprove. At least, the question
remains an open one.
Second, economic theorists debate whether norms are likely to
promote social welfare. Ellickson, Cooter and James Coleman are
optimistic about norm efficiency, although they note several
qualifications-including the danger that group norms may benefit the
group by harming those outside the group.59 Becker also thinks norms
will tend to be beneficial to the entire society even though his theory
contemplates that the norm primarily benefits the wealthy classes.'
Other theorists are more critical. Russell Hardin, for example, claims
that the most common and most powerful group norms are norms of
"exclusion," the very norms that benefit the group at the expense of those
excluded.6' Eric Posner bases his skepticism for norm efficiency on the
pervasive problems of information and strategic behavior that sometimes
cause market failure.62 Given my beliefs about norm origin-that norms
can arise arbitrarily simply because people approve of behavior they
prefer for themselves-I also believe many norms constrain individuals
without producing any societal benefit.'
A final and related question is intensely legal: should the state
regulate particular norms? If we decide that a norm is desirable-perhaps
one obligating neighbors to recycle or prohibiting diamond merchants
from committing deceptive trade practices-should law attempt to
strengthen the norm by enforcing it? If we decide that a norm is
58. Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 41, at 1674-75.
59. See COLEMAN, supra note 40, at 249-58; ELLicKSON, supra note 38, at 167
("rM]embers of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to
maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one
another."); Cooter, StructuralAdjudication, supra note 41, at 224-26 (claiming that norms
in business communities tend to be efficient absent structures that cause "spillovers" or
"nonconvexities").
60. See BECKER, supra note 3, at 230.
61. HARDIN, supra note 40.
62. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697 (1996); see also David Charny, Illusions of Spontaneous Order: "Norins" in
Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1848 (1996) (arguing that when
norms arise from centralized processes within formal organizations-such as industry-wide
trade associations-they are likely to be the product of interest group competition and
therefore be plagued by the inefficiencies that public choice theory attributes to legislative
rule-making).
63. See McAdams, supra note 56.
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undesirable-as one obligating race or sex discrimination or a teenager
norm against studying-should law be used in some manner to weaken the
norm? And if we decide that norms are, on average, efficient or
inefficient, should the law take some action that makes norm enforcement,
in general, more or less difficult?'
More complex governance issues arise if one adopts Neil Komesar's
comparative institutional framework.' Komesar reminds us that the
important decision is always "who decides," which means we must
consider the strengths and weaknesses institutions possess for deciding
certain kinds of questions. Komesar focuses on legislatures, markets and
courts,66 but one concerned with norms might follow Ed Rubin's
alternative institutional division: government, markets, and community.67
"Community" here includes social influences on behavior such as group
and societal norms. Thus, the state may regulate a behavior directly, it
may avoid direct regulation and allow market and community forces to
manage the behavior together (perhaps after a struggle one institution
"wins" and displaces the other), or it may explicitly favor one of the
other institutions as the regulator of the behavior.6" For example,
government may set a curfew for juveniles, directly regulating when they
can be in public. More often, government avoids prescribing the details
of child rearing and defers the issue to the other institutions. But the
form of deference clearly favors the family (a community group) over the
market, both because the government limits market participation by
minors (e.g., with legal obligations to attend school and limits on child
labor) and because it grants parents power over minor children (e.g., the
right to use corporal punishment) that it does not grant to other
individuals.
In sum, norms present one of the most important ways economists
are complicating their models. Explaining norms requires either greater
attention to social forces like status or the psychological forces by which
obligations are internalized. I have not described all the disputes within
law and economics on norms, but the above three are sufficient to
understand what is at stake. In individual cases, economic scholars
64. See McAdams, supra note 49, at 2264-66.
65. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994); Neil K. Komesar,
Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional Choice, 1997 Wis. L. REV.
465.
66. See KOMESAR, supra note 65, at 53-152.
67. Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995
Wis. L. REV. 463, 475.
68. 1 realize this framing puts government in charge of deciding "who decides,"
but as Rubin observes, see supra note 67, one must address scholarship to an audience,
and I address those who may influence government.
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sometimes rely heavily on the empirical findings of other social sciences.
But I raise the issue here in the hopes of sparking more direct exchange.
I have no doubt that much of any exchange will be critical-that law and
society scholars may wonder whether it was better when economists
merely ignored norms. But I also suspect that some of the issues will cut
across conventional disciplinary lines, so that scholars in each field will
be as likely to find allies in the other as in their own. That would be
interesting.

